Gwynfor had a deep antipathy towards the Labour Party and its Government

Elystan Morgan reminiscing - Plaid Cymru, Saunders Lewis and Gwynfor Evans.

Last in the series - very interesting

Elystan Morgan discusses the different characteristics of Saunders Lewis and Gwynfor Evans.

Outlines Gwynfor's deep antipathy towards the Labour Party and its Government.

Gwynfor's words to Elystan when told that he was joining the Labour Party - 'the party of Bessie Braddock'.

The difficulties he faced inside Plaid Cymru from the party's left wingers - some of them on the far left.

In the years prior to the by election in Carmarthen in 1966 Gwynfor had been facing significant pressures from within the party over its failure of electoral progress and especially after the controversy over Tryweryn.

But seemingly fate intervened!

Initially when Lady Megan Lloyd George was chosen by the Labour Party instead of  the young John Morris (by one vote) in 1957, then the decision made by the local Labour party not to select someone to contest the March 1966 General Election, despite the fact that Lady Megan was terminally ill and finally the choice of the North Walian Gwilym Prys Davies to contest the Carmarthen by election of July 1966 instead of the local candidate from Cynwyl Elfed, Denzil Davies.

Gwynoro describes how people in the Gwendraeth and Amman Valleys were telling him when campaigning during the by-election how they did not 'understand' Gwilym Prys speaking with his deep North Wales accent.

Elystan then relates a similar story when he was campaigning in Anglesey and with Cledwyn Hughes in Llangefni 1979.

A Constitutional Continuum...

A guest essay by Glyndwr Cennydd Jones.

This substantial piece leads on from his previous essay titled ‘Towards federalism and beyond’ published on this website in July 2016. Writing in a personal capacity, Glyndwr is an advocate for greater cross-party consensus in Wales.



Summarising the nature and functions of today’s United Kingdom (UK), the introduction to the report titled Devolution and the Future of the Union (Constitution Unit, University College London: April 2015) explains that the ‘economic union provides the UK with a single market, with a single currency and strong central fiscal regime. The social union provides the social solidarity which binds the UK together, by redistributing revenue, and pooling and sharing risk through welfare benefits and pensions. In the political union, every part of the UK is represented in the Westminster Parliament, which manages the economic and social unions, and as the sovereign parliament can itself reshape the political union.’ However, the report goes on to highlight that ‘Whitehall lacks capacity to think about the Union because it has relegated it to issues of devolution on the fringes’ and that ‘devolution policy making has become rushed to the point of recklessness.’

This observation is mirrored in the Constitutional Convention report (Institute of Welsh Affairs: April 2015) of the same month which asserts that ‘policies around the UK and the union have been dealt with in an ad-hoc and reactive manner and there has been little cohesive thought to address the role of the union as a whole.’ Interestingly, respondents to the convention felt that ‘UK Government policies were often detrimental to Wales and not in keeping with the grain of public opinion’ and that there was a lack of ‘vision about what the union should provide for each person in the UK regardless of whether they live in Belfast or Bangor’.

These challenges have been brought sharply into focus over recent years through the increasingly differentiated politics across the four nations as well as the vigorous debates about English Votes for English Laws, a second independence referendum for Scotland and the Wales Bill 2016-17. For example, a consultation on the design options for an English Parliament is presently in progress at the Constitution Unit, University College London. The outcome of the European Union (EU) referendum in June 2016 has compounded events even further, particularly in relation to determining the correct constitutional process for triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.

The UK Supreme Court, last week, heard cases for and against whether Parliament not Government should have the authority to activate the process for exiting the EU. Speaking on behalf of the First Minster of Wales, Carwyn Jones, public law barrister Richard Gordon QC stressed in his written submission that the UK is now ‘a voluntary association of nations which share and redistribute resources and risks between us to our mutual benefit and to advance our common interests.’ He elaborated by explaining that the Assembly exercises a plethora of powers through EU law and that ‘devolution is about how the UK is collectively governed by four administrations which are not in a hierarchical relationship to one to another.’ The tone of this assertion is enlightening as the language alludes to a more quasi-federal framework of relationships between the four nations rather than the devolved and reserved powers model in place within an overarching unitary state.

Pausing for a moment, we should not underestimate the extent to which the UK’s entry to the EU during the 1970s tempered a measure of perceptible disenchantment across the isles at a time when constitutional matters had just been explored in some detail by the Crowther/Kilbrandon Royal Commission, resulting in the devolution referenda of March 1979 in Scotland and Wales. It could be suggested that EU membership was instrumental in promoting respect for the rich cultural diversity of peoples within the UK and the range of languages spoken.

If we are indeed approaching a crossroads of sorts in our island journey, what are the alternative models of governance available? With consideration that we are all intrinsically linked culturally and historically in modern times through shared industrial, political and international experiences—whilst acknowledging the assorted ancient traditions of our roots—this question prompts a range of responses depending on where one places an emphasis on the economic to social measuring scale. An alternative way of posing the problem might be to ask how we could better set about empowering the people of these isles from Lands End to John o’ Groats and Londonderry to Newcastle in improving standards of living and personal fulfilment through a political system and ensuing policies which promote economic success regionally, nationally and globally whilst maintaining internal and external security...

It was Ron Davies, former Secretary of State for Wales, who said before the dawn of the Welsh Assembly in 1999 that ‘devolution is a process not an event’. Though wholly appropriate at the time, it was a statement most likely born of an acknowledgement that the arrangements for Wales would limit the likelihood of progress from the beginning, particularly when compared with the robust powers offered to Scotland. The journey ever since has been one of uncertainty, lacking in strategic direction. Lord Elystan Morgan recently summed up this viewpoint by explaining: ‘when you deal with a long period of transferring small powers, day in day out... you create a situation that almost guarantees some constitutional neurosis on the part of Welsh lawyers’. He further asserts that ‘the Wales Bill 2016-17 is deeply flawed and a blue print for failure and disaster’ particularly because of the ‘fact that there are about two hundred reservations—the very nature of which makes the matter a nonsense.’

Does a dependency governance structure predictably result in a dependency culture, to which despite eloquent arguments to the contrary, the economic profile of the UK’s constituent parts might uncomfortably attest?  Does a unitary state system with devolution included as an adjunct compare awkwardly to the relationship between a parent/guardian and a young person in terms of developing accountability and responsibility?  Is it only by seeking greater independence that individuals are empowered to make informed decisions and accept the consequences of their actions in time—and to take account of the legitimate concerns and opinions of others for the wider benefit? In national terms, there is indeed a clear distinction between the existentialist and utilitarian views of self-government. The former demands more autonomy simply because of a belief that it is the natural right for nations, and the latter considering it as a path to a better society—to achieve the most effective political unit to secure the economic growth and social justice that people deserve.

So any constitutional settlement for these isles must take account of the economic and social interrelationships between the four nations. Such considerations are critical in a political environment where the EU cannot be relied upon as the mechanism for implementing shared policies and practices in the future. The report titled A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law: May 2015) highlights that the ‘border between England and Wales is crossed about 130,000 times each day’ and that ‘forty-eight per cent of the Welsh population lives within 25 miles of the border with England.’ Many people living in Wales have close family and friends in England as well as vice versa. Human considerations of this kind cannot be ignored in the discussion. The Bingham report recommends that the ‘UK should remain a fully integrated single market with a single currency and common macro-economic framework in which citizens are free to live, to work, to trade and to retire without legal impediment.’

It is therefore essential that the ‘four countries of the Union severally and together commit to the principle of shared solidarity, collaborating for the common good and for economic and social cohesion across the UK as whole.’ This statement is taken from the report titled The UK’s Changing Union: Towards a new Union (Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University: February 2015) which explores some of the potential core principles underpinning a possible settlement. In particular it goes on to suggest that the ‘parties to the Union acknowledge the dominant role of England within it and that England has its needs and rights, but that England also acknowledges that the asymmetry between it and the other nations is of such a scale as to require tempering, in the interests of fairness, by the introduction of a range of institutional mechanisms.’

What are the specific governance options available to our island community? To continue on the present course is to accept constitutional uncertainty and political vulnerability as illustrated by the recent lively debates on the proposed Wales Bill 2016-17 in both Houses of Parliament and the process for triggering Article 50 in the UK Supreme Court. Devomax may rank as an attractive solution to some, but even this does not address the ambiguity and complexity introduced by the general primacy of Westminster and the inherent challenges presented by the unitary state model—accompanied by the now disconcerting shadow of a potentially hard ‘Brexit’ imposed on all four nations.

It has been broadly suggested that the answer rests somewhere in a ‘system of government in which central and constituent nation authorities are linked in an interdependent political relationship, in which powers and functions are distributed to achieve a substantial degree of autonomy and integrity in the national units. In theory, such a system seeks to maintain a balance such that neither level of government becomes sufficiently dominant to dictate the decision of the other, unlike in a unitary system, in which the central authorities hold primacy to the extent even of redesigning or abolishing constituent nation and local units of government at will’. This is the definition of federalism offered by the New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (HarperCollins 2000), with the word ‘regional’ replaced by the term ‘constituent nation’ as italicised for the contextual purpose of this essay.

A Federation of the Isles could indeed bond the principles of empowerment and responsibility with accountability and authority to provide constitutional clarity and stability across the constituent nations and the whole, especially with established mechanisms in place to progress joint interests and resolve disputes. It would also capitalise on the potential for realising economies of scale in the application of some key centrally-held functions—such as currency, defence, foreign relations and the internal market—as well as a greater projection of political influence to attract investment internationally. Examples of federations include Germany and the USA.

Others hint at a League or Union of the Isles as a solution. This model could be summarised as a form of confederation established by treaty—in contrast to a federal constitution—which addresses the crucially shared interests of internal trade and currency as well as defence and foreign relations, if so desired. Under a confederation-type arrangement the central body is relatively weak,  compared with a federal parliament, as decisions made by a ‘council’ of member nations would require subsequent implementation by the individual nations to take effect. These pronouncements are therefore not laws acting directly upon individual members, but instead have more the character of agreements between nations.

A League or Union of the Isles presents to each member nation the advantages and challenges of acting as an independent state within an isles-wide alliance. A treaty on issues of joint concern would aim to mitigate the risks associated with fragmenting previously delivered common functions. However, competitive considerations between member nations would have more prominence when negotiating within a confederation-type relationship, balanced against the consensus-built model offered by federalism. In addition, the probable cost savings realised through the operation of officially shared mechanisms in key areas would not be secured. Interestingly, a League or Union of the Isles could invite the participation of the Republic of Ireland if it so wished. The Benelux and European Unions are examples of this kind of understanding.

 

Wales as a nation state within the EU is worth mentioning as a model for further exploration in time, but would not be realistically workable if England—Wales’s largest social and trading partner—was not also in the EU. A form of League or Union of the Isles would need to be in place to facilitate the necessary economic, political and social relationships. The Welsh public also effectively voted against EU membership in June 2016. It goes without saying that an independent Wales acting on its own outside European or isles-wide agreements would have limited longevity, doing little to improve the population’s standard of living. Some might suggest that Wales’ operational interactions with England could be satisfactorily addressed by a bilateral treaty, but this approach is likely to prove unsustainable over time with uncertainty in collective aims discouraging business investment, accompanied by a general drift of capital and employment prospects towards the larger partner in the east.

Similar could be said of an Atlantic Union comprising treaties between Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and potentially the Republic of Ireland—with all participants in the EU too. This model has little economic and geographical traction. For example, Scotland may find access to greater opportunities through participation in a Scandinavian treaty of some description, and the Republic of Ireland is already a long-standing member of the EU on its own accord—does it need to concern itself directly and singularly with Wales at this level of formality? 

So to answer the question posed, there are indeed constitutional alternatives to the present unitary system with devolution tagged on since 1999. In early November 2016, Lord David Owen issued a pamphlet calling for a cross-party convention to consider the creation of a federal council modelled on the German Bundesrat. He writes passionately that such an institution could help unite the UK in the aftermath of the EU referendum and ‘restore our very democracy which had been distorted by the false claim of post-modernism that the days of the nation-state were over. Far from being over‘ Lord Owen insists that ‘national identity, whether it be Scottish, Welsh, Irish or English deserves to be treasured as a binding force, not a divisive one. It all depends on whether we can find the correct balance.’ The pamphlet goes on to explore a federal model which invites participation of the English regions. A similar outlook was expressed simultaneously by Gordon Brown in an article titled A Revolt of the Regions (New Statesman: 3  November 2016). The former Prime Minister’s intervention prompted the following joint statement by London Mayor Sadiq Khan; First Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones, and mayoral candidate for Greater Manchester Andy Burnham: ‘Only by achieving a new, fair settlement for all nations and regions can we be sure of saving the UK from further fracture’ and ‘tackling rising inequality’.

Another report titled Federal Britain: The Case for Decentralisation (Institute of Economic Affairs: 2015) advocates ‘a federal state...with Scotland...England, Wales and Northern Ireland separately, becoming nations within a federal union. The federal government should have a very limited number of powers including defence, foreign affairs and border control and a small parliament and executive.’ It affirms that ‘no other proposed solution to the English question can provide the same stability or beneficial economic outcomes.’  The establishment of a federal UK with England, as one unit, alongside Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland presents opportunities and challenges in terms of a proposed constitutional settlement for these isles. For Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the real challenge of such a structure is that England’s population equates to over 84 per cent of the whole, approximately accounting for 55 million individuals of an overall 65 million. London’s economic prominence is also a significant consideration.

 

England, as a nation, is indeed a better counterpart to Wales and Scotland for participation in a federal configuration than the English regions, due to its stronger political and social cohesion. However, a bicameral federal parliament—formed to deliver those responsibilities consigned to a central level as defined by a written constitution—with an upper chamber comprising representatives of London, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast would inescapably raise questions around the number of votes assigned to each constituent nation if influenced by population sizes. This approach is explored by David Melding in his book Will Britain Survive Beyond 2020 (Institute of Welsh Affairs: 2009).  A constitutional court would strive to guard the privileges of all governance levels, but any counter-balancing mechanisms introduced to support the sharing of authority centrally must be easily understood by the civil service, politicians and public to ensure coherence and harmony. An alternative would be a unicameral model.

An English government would, in principle, be supported by the authorities of Greater London and other city regions at the direct level of governance beneath—mitigating the risk of over-centralisation in relation to the sizeable population of England. The historical counties may also aspire to an aspect of autonomy. Quite naturally, the actions and choices of one constituent nation could have negative or positive consequences on others in a federal arrangement as highlighted in the report A Federal Future for the UK: The Options (Federal Trust for Education and Research: July 2010). Various scenarios would need to be deliberated earnestly when designating powers within a constitution, including appropriate instruments for resolving disagreements.  Governments must be discouraged from misusing any possible advantages they possess on specific issues. Areas of potential contention might include, for example, the economy of England, the oil of Scotland and the water of Wales. 

In April 2016, the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University issued a report titled Government Expenditure and Revenue: Wales 2016 which identified total public sector revenue in Wales as £23.3 billion for 2014-15, approximately 3.6% of total UK revenues of £648.8 billion. The largest source of Welsh revenue was Value Added Tax followed by Income Tax and National Insurance Contributions. This composition contrasted significantly with the UK as a whole where direct taxes such as Income Tax and Corporation Tax constituted a larger proportion. The report also estimated managed expenditure in Wales for the same period as £38 billion, approximately 5.2% of total UK expenditure of £737.1 billion. Social protection accounted for most of Welsh expenditure, including social security payments and pensions etc, followed by health and education. The Assembly government in Cardiff and local authorities were responsible for 53% of this total spend with the remainder attributed to UK government departments.  Therefore, greater fiscal devolution presents opportunities and risks. In the medium to long term much depends on how a more influential Welsh government and an informed public respond to financial empowerment, whilst questions remain on how the deficit should be supported during transition whether through adjustment of the Welsh block grant and/or borrowing.

A federal parliament, most likely London-based, would need to promote equality in sharing baseline investment, particularly in relation to a redistribution of a proportion of the joint prosperity generated through the federal capital to the constituent nations. To again quote from the report titled UK’s Changing Union: Towards a new Union (Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University: February 2015) we should explore a ‘system for determining the fair distribution and redistribution of financial resources on a clear statutory basis...designed to be equitable between all parties on the basis of examination of needs and with no expectation that transfers would be continued when needs had been met satisfactorily.’

Despite the comparative scale of England contrasted with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the benefits of moving towards a federal arrangement significantly outweigh the challenges faced. Gwynoro Jones, an experienced political commentator on matters of Welsh devolution, went on the record in September 2016 as stating ‘I believe that the future lies, at the very least, in a self-governing Wales within a Federal UK. An argument can be made for going further...’  The impetus required to initiate progress from the unitary state model—with devolved and reserved powers allocated variously across the piece—is presently gathering apace. As already highlighted, this momentum is underpinned by the increasingly differentiated politics across the four nations and the spirited deliberations about English Votes for English Laws, a second independence referendum for Scotland, the Wales Bill 2016-17, Brexit and even the Trump phenomenon which, to some degree, has implications beyond the USA.
 

On balance, the progressively sustainable model rests somewhere between a Federation and, in time, a League or Union of the Isles. In the crudest of terms, the former option has aspects of a safety net deployed with shared mechanisms for core functions and policy portfolios to support the realisation of economies of scale in delivery, and greater projection of joint interests across constituent nations and the world. The latter option allows for consensus building and negotiation between fully empowered member nations, but with some risk of competitive considerations and disputes holding-up relationships. A League or Union-type model might be to England’s advantage more than Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland due to its larger economy and size of population, but we should not underestimate our shared concerns, as an island community, in defence, social mobility and trade for which an incline towards Federation would provide constitutional clarity, comfort and confidence.

To paraphrase an old Chinese curse which doubles as an expression of the opportunity change presents ‘We live in interesting times’.

 

Lord Owen sets out proposals for a Federal UK Council and a progressive alliance

Addressing a seminar on ‘Politics post-Brexit’ at Cardiff University’s School of Law and Politics, Lord Owen set out proposals for a UK-wide Federal Council drawing comparisons with the German Bundesrat.

The big political question is how to establish a Federal structure for the UK and what is the best approach. A Constitutional Convention in all its different forms or even a Royal Commission are suggested. Whatever the forum, I am convinced it needs a specific, not a general mandate if it is to be capable of attracting full SNP

participation. 

This pamphlet argues  a-federal-uk-council-2 for a focused cross-party investigation of the

German Federal Bundesrat, without any commitment as to the outcome. It is

something which needs to be offered early in the term of office of the new Prime

Minister Theresa May, and is designed to appeal to the many Scottish, English, Welsh

and Irish people spread across the UK who sense post-Brexit we need a new

mechanism to hold the UK together by common consent.

A strictly limited approach to a Federal UK was put forward before Brexit on 16

March 2016 just as the referendum was getting underway by the All Party

Parliamentary Group [APPG] on Reform, Decentralisation and Devolution, sadly

without SNP representation. The Group’s report entitled 'Devolution and the Union'

included the Conservative Constitutional expert, Lord Norton, and a Conservative MP,

Lady Victoria Borwick, and its Chairman was the former head of the Civil Service,

now Crossbencher, Lord Kerslake. It made a broadly sympathetic short reference to

the Bundesrat but only a minimalist recommendation that the UK "Government

embarks upon a nation-wide, citizen based conversation to include the electorate in

matters relating to our constitutional identity." This wording emerged after careful

examination of the biggest problem, namely the asymmetrical structure of the UK.

Post Brexit this approach is too general. A “conversation” does not have the sense of

momentum that Brexit has engendered. The asymmetry of the UK is well recognized

but a design can be found which accommodates it building on the technique of

‘degressive proportionality’1. Running in tandem our exit from the EU with the

creation of a Federal UK Council is both feasible and proper.

There is no overload different people and different issues are involved in the two negotiations, but they fit together. Postponing a Federal UK Council would be an error and risks missing a moment in history. 

In January 2015 in a pamphlet 'The Crisis of the Constitution’ Vernon

Bogdanor suggested that before a UK Convention gets under way it "needs to be

preceded in England at least by a learning process". He suggested a Royal

Commission or equivalent body.

But Constitutional Commissions to be effective require an all party consensus. In Scotland I doubt a Royal Commission, without a specific and focused remit, would be seen as anything other than a delaying device which is broadly how Royal Commissions are now viewed since their recommendations have been all too frequently shelved.

Prime Minister Theresa May should embrace a Convention on an all party

basis to examine the Bundesrat model as possibly, with adjustments and specific proposals, the best way of establishing a Federal UK.

If the Prime Minister does not act before the end of 2016 on the issue of a federal UK then the Labour Party and SNP should forge an initial agreement during 2017 to build a cross party Convention capable of involving other UK parties to sit in 2018 and 2019.

The atmosphere is sour in the Westminster Parliament at present for a variety of

reasons, in particular the Boundary Commission remit to reduce the House of

Commons from 650 MPs to 600 members has caused resentment and made

cooperation between Labour and the Conservatives difficult. Also the electoral

success of the SNP has made for controversy between the Labour Party and the SNP.

Some will ask: can the SNP negotiate a federal UK or are they only committed

to separation? The answers lie in a speech Nicola Sturgeon made in 2012 when not

yet leader of the SNP. Her speech in Strathclyde recorded how Neil MacCormick, the son of one of the SNP’s founders and a distinguished academic at Edinburgh

University, had distinguished between “existentialist” and “utilitarian” varieties of

Scottish nationalism, the first demanding independence simply because that is what

nations should have, and the second seeing it as a route to a better society.

In a perceptive article in the Guardian on 23 April 2015 Ian Jack who writes with

sensitivity and respect on Scotland supported this distinction. He returned to the

theme in late September 2016 in the Guardian still seeing its potential despite the

adverse Scottish reaction to Brexit.

Nicola Sturgeon recognized in 2012 that while some (by implication older) SNP

members were existentialists she was a utilitarian; for her, she said,

“the fact of nationhood or Scottish identity is not the motive force for independence ... nor do I believe that independence, however desirable, is essential for the preservation of our distinctive Scottish identity. And I don’t agree at all that feeling British – with all of the shared social, family and cultural heritage that makes up such an identity – is in any way inconsistent with a pragmatic, utilitarian support for political independence.”

Nicola Sturgeon also said that Scotland had to focus on

“the most effective political and economic unit to achieve the economic growth and the social justice that the Scottish people want’’

It is, in many ways, our version of the same question being asked across all mature western democracies: how to build a thriving but sustainable economy that benefits the many, not the few. The Westminster system of government has had its chance – and failed. Today, independence is the pragmatic way forward."

On this basis Sturgeon can, at least, conceive of a progressive alliance in a

Convention establishing a better pragmatic way forward than Scottish separation from the UK. I hope that after discussion and reflection she and the SNP would at least consider a Bundesrat-like mechanism for the UK worth examining in depth with

others from parties in the UK.

Eventual EU membership and membership of the EEA is an illusion for

Scotland as a separate entity even were it to separate from the UK and that reality

needs to be faced. Many of the gas and oil revenue assumptions on which the

SNP campaigned and lost on the referendum on separation in 2014 have been shown to be invalid by movement downwards of the price of oil and gas. Scotland is now running a 9% deficit in GDP, mostly due to the oil price falling, and yet no country is even considered as a new entrant to the EU unless the deficit is below 3%.

There is also a growing recognition in Scotland that as Spain faces a growing demand for independence from Catalonia there is an absolute refusal of any Spanish government to consider establishing a precedent in the EU. It is hard to reach any other practical conclusion that there are other countries too in the EU who will not lift their implicit veto on any separatist country being admitted. Wallonia stood out over the ratification of the trade agreement with Canada (CETA). This was fortunately changed by agreement within Belgium. It, nevertheless, was another recognition that very small countries within an existing EU country are a potentially divisive element which could be potentially even more so if they were granted independence. The option of separate EU membership for Scotland or for Wales does not exist.

At the SNP 2015 party conference Nicola Sturgeon said she was a social

democrat not a flags and anthems nationalist. She had a high profile on UK-wide TV

in the 2015 general election and the 2016 EU referendum and as a result has earned

name recognition and standing. The question of any future Scottish referendum will,

of course, hang over any constitutional dialogue on Brexit between Edinburgh and

London.

While the Article 50 negotiations are proceeding it will probably be shelved.

For most people in England any further referendum which a UK government might

endorse should be linked to a settled will of the Scottish people with no dates fixed.

The present Westminster Parliament will not recognize another Scottish referendum

merely because Scotland voted to stay in the EU in 2016. It is a fact that the

commitment to hold an EU referendum was announced in 2013 by David Cameron

while Prime Minister well before the actual Scottish referendum vote in 2014.

Also there are profound and many-sided dangers and principled objections to the

constitutional integrity of a UK-wide EU referendum carrying within it a threat of

another referendum in a part of the UK who do not agree with the other parts. A

constitutional referendum result needs to be respected everywhere in the UK. The

case for a constitutional referendum on Scottish separation depends, as in the existing commitment in Northern Ireland for potential referenda on joining with the South, on it being exceptional not a running event. There is still merit in referenda being, as SNP leaders indicated before 2014, a “once in a generation” event. It should not be a periodic test of will dependent on opinion polls or on other UK referendum results.

What of Wales, the land of my father and mother? There are lessons to learn

from the way its devolution settlement, which was only carried in a referendum by a

minuscule majority in 1997, with Cardiff and Newport voting against, has developed

and has now achieved wide popular appeal. The devolved National Assembly for

Wales or Senedd has embedded itself into Welsh politics and culture developing a

distinct Welsh political will that has not previously surfaced in Wales since the early

Middle Ages in the days of Hywel Dda and Wales showed its new image in rejecting

Labour’s advice over the UK referendum and, in contrast to Scotland, voted strongly

for Brexit, except in Cardiff, the Vale of Glamorgan and in Y Fro Gymraeg where

most people speak Welsh.

A Constitutional Convention on the Bundesrat cannot carry any commitment to

a positive recommendation. The test is whether this model does or does not not satisfy rigorous scrutiny of its potential. Only within one situation will any UK Federal

Council legislation follow: that is when sufficient MPs are ready to vote for the

reforms in the House of Commons. A Constitutional Convention divorced from party

political manifestoes and formally agreed pre-election alliances will be a mere talking

shop or academic exercise.

What the coalition government of 2010-15 demonstrated is that the postelection

horse trading in forming a coalition government, with no prior manifesto

authority, is not a sufficient, let alone a satisfactory, basis for ensuring Acts of

Parliament. Both AV and Lords Reform put forward by the coalition were rejected:

the first in a referendum, the second in Parliament.

The lesson of all this is that on constitutional reform it is better to start

discussions between the parties before elections. Fixed Term parliaments have like most reforms, disadvantages and advantages but it does ensure that a government is likely to last long enough to legislate manifesto commitments to a Federal UK Council and overcome resistance from the House of Lords since they would lose their existing revising powers on federal legislation.

Prime Minister Theresa May, as Brexit proceeded under Article 50, established

a timetable for a formal procedure involving the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU

having talks with the First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which

because of the power sharing executive includes Martin McGuinness from Sinn Fein.

This is a good start. The Prime Minister could call together this same forum to start an initial dialogue on a Federal UK Council initially chaired by herself and involving

defining terms of reference, participants and the timing for reporting back from a

Convention.

There are complex questions about what constitutes federal legislation

and the nature of the mediation procedures between a Federal UK Council and the

House of Commons, all much better agreed under a Government-led Convention.

Meanwhile an unprecedented Constitutional dialogue is developing between

the SNP led Scottish Parliament and David Davies’ new Department in Whitehall

about the European Economic Area agreement, EEAA. The evidence that is being

evaluated is not about whether to leave the EU and the Treaty of Lisbon; that is

increasingly being taken as a given, something one might strongly disagree with but a recognition that a referendum cannot be bucked.

What can, however, shape the future is the Scottish belief that the UK’s relationship with the EEA has a lot of subtleties within it which need teasing out before any rational decision can be taken.

The submission to the Scottish Parliament by George Yarrow is attached to this pamphlet as Annex A. It is worth explaining that the EEA Agreement does not cover the following EU policies: CAP; CFP (although it contains limited provisions on trade in agricultural and fish products); the Customs Unions; common trade policy; common foreign and security policy; justice and home affairs. The UK is already opted out of the Schengen area and economic and monetary union. All these will go with the Treaty of Lisbon under an Article 50 exit from the EU before the end of 2019.

What if Theresa May decides not to create such a Convention to assess the

Bundesrat? Would Jeremy Corbyn agree that Labour should play a constructive role

in establishing such a Convention with the SNP in 2017, well before the 2020 General Election?

The first essential question, as for the SNP, is does Labour have the political will?

Can trust be established on such a focused proposition as creating a Bundesrat model for the UK?

I believe Corbyn could agree to a Convention as the UK Labour Party leader more easily now that Labour’s Scottish Party has been given greater freedom. It is obvious that UK constitutional reform has to go wider than a purely inter-Scotland political debate that will remain polarized between the SNP and Labour in Scotland up to and during the 2020 General Election.

Almost every psephologist agrees that the SNP are most likely to remain the

third largest party in the Westminster Parliament after the 2020 General Election.

That may be wrong but it must be an inescapable factor in Labour’s own calculation

of their chances of outright victory in 2020.

Corbyn has shown he has an appeal to the young, he seems to many authentic as a person and interested in extending as, he says, democracy outside Westminster. He could accept the challenge of participating in a Constitutional Convention with the SNP. But will the SNP believe he has a chance of emerging as the Prime Minister?

Many, at this stage in opinion polling, believe he cannot ever be elected Prime

Minister. History, however, often shows it is governments who lose elections rather

than the main opposition party winning General Elections.

 Corbyn's unique problems stem from a lack of support as a potential Prime Minister from as many as 170 Labour MPs in the House of Commons who made their criticisms known publicly. That may diminish but it is unlikely to disappear completely by 2020. He has one very distinctive hobby as an allotment holder. In my experience of allotment holders in Plymouth they are independent figures all of a piece content in their own skin.

Corbyn is not someone the right wing press have been able, despite trying, to dismiss out of hand as a Trotskyist. Nor to depict as a hater of his country. In the 2016 annual conference in Liverpool he seemed to be readier to show he is not a pacifist and does see the need for conventional defence.  His personal position against nuclear deterrence, however, may mean Labour will not be elected as a government.

Corbyn may, having secured a far more left wing programme for Labour since

1945, be content to step down as leader of the parliamentary party, as distinct from

leader of the party in the country, in the autumn of 2019 before the 2020 General

Election. The risk if Corbyn does not split the two roles is that he might well be

ousted before the 2020 election as was Lansbury in 1935i. Lansbury, the only

declared pacifist leader of the Labour Party, was denounced by Ernest Bevin, then

leader of the T&GWU, only weeks away from the General Election and stood down

as leader. Attlee stepped in as the acting leader when Labour increased its

representation in the House of Commons from 52 to 154 MPs. Attlee was then elected leader defeating Herbert Morrison and Arthur Greenwood.

By remaining just leader of the Party outside Parliament in 2019 Corbyn could

ensure much of the left wing policies he by then will probably have built into

Labour’s manifesto. Other political parties have split these two roles. For example,

when Willy Brandt resigned in May 1974 as German Chancellor over Guillaume, one

of his advisers being involved in spying for East Germany, his successor, Helmut

Schmidt, explicitly asked him to retain the post of party chairman. Later Schmidt

wondered after being forced out as Chancellor in 1982 by Hans-Dietrich Genscher

switching Liberal support to Kohl if he should have taken on both roles. But the SPD

at that time was badly split between left and right factions and one commentator

wrote about Brandt's influence,

“Under no other Chairman would the SPD have followed Government policy so far without rebelling or falling apart”

There are individual MPs in all parties who in 2016 support a federal UK

conceptually but will oppose other reforms like proportional representation to elect

MPs to the House of Commons or an elected second chamber for the House of Lords.

This reality can and should be taken into account in limiting reform initially to

considering the Bundesrat model. Such self discipline will be hard to achieve.

Particularly since proportional representation [PR] for the House of Commons is the

big prize for the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. It is, however, less so for the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Northern Ireland parties since PR exists for the Scottish

Parliament and the respective Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies. Labour MPs

are still divided over introducing PR for the Westminster Parliament. These are the

realities and a reason for starting the dialogue on a federal UK in Labour and the SNP.

What of the term Progressive Alliance? Even that raises questions for a federal

UK reform. The Liberal Democrats, before they join any Labour/SNP progressive

alliance would need to show, after their record in the coalition government of 2010-15, that they are truly back again as a progressive political party in the eyes of SNP and Labour supporters. That means, for example, divorcing themselves from their

continuing support for the marketising of the English NHS as provided for in the

Health and Social Care Act 2012 which during the Liberal Democrats’ time in

coalition was opposed by Labour and even more strongly by the SNP.

No 'progressive alliance' worth the name can be credibly formed under Labour and the SNP if the Liberal Democrat party also goes on keeping their options open on doing a deal with the Conservatives again in 2020. Fortunately one of their eight MPs, John Pugh, is a signed up supporter of the reinstatement of a non marketised NHS but the former health minister in the coalition government of 2010-2015, Norman Lamb, is still equivocal at best and at worst against abandoning market driven NHS changes.

There are many other examples where Tim Farron appears to be returning to the Liberal tactic of splitting the difference between Labour and the Conservatives.

All this means that there is no need for Labour and the SNP to hurry over

opening up any cross party constitutional convention to the Liberal Democrats in

2017. Though the Greens and Plaid Cymru present no such difficulties over being

truly progressive, it would probably make more sense to ask them to participate later

with the Liberal Democrats rather than earlier. But the SNP and/or Labour may prefer to have them involved from the start, along with other parties from Northern Ireland.

Since the SNP and Labour, in coalition with Plaid Cymru, control the Scottish

Parliament and Welsh Assembly respectively they will have some resources, both

financial and in terms of expertise, to help provide key information for a Convention

and so while it will be unfortunate not to have the assistance of Whitehall its effects

can be negated by the use of academics, thereby ensuring the quality of any

Convention.

A federal UK Council is radical politics such as we have not seen since 1906.

Brexit makes it sensible for the power sharing Executive in Northern Ireland to also

participate in full in a Convention if there has been progress made between Labour

and the SNP. The process must ultimately be as inclusive as possible and at some

stage it would be worth inviting sympathetic individual Conservative MPs to join.

For all these reasons, it may be wiser for the initial Constitutional Convention to be

limited in 2017 to only Labour and the SNP. Then to open up to all the other

opposition parties in late 2018-2019 if there is emerging a basis for agreement, and to encourage individual Conservatives and Unionists to participate.

To start to establish a Convention infrastructure, Labour and the SNP will need

funds and to appoint research workers, and agree on a Chair of the proceedings,

possibly an independent without party political affiliation. A broad based Convention

starting in January 2018 would still give time to absorb the implications of any

recommendations at party conferences in 2019 and make manifesto commitments

well before the General Election in 2020. This means completing the Convention’s

work by the end of 2019.

At the 2020 election party politicians would certainly in Scotland and for the

most part elsewhere in the UK be competing for votes with no electoral pacts while at the same time presenting themselves as ready to fight for UK constitutional change on a cross-party manifesto commitment not subject to a referendum.

Recently talk of constitutional reform has been firstly an academic subject and

then something to be done only by all the parties and through referendums. Yet

constitutional reform has been in the past politically very controversial. We should

remember, for instance, how, on 24 July 1911 during the Parliament Bill, the

Conservatives howled down Asquith as Prime Minister for 30 minutes in partisan

rage while he remained on his feet unable to speak until Foreign Secretary Grey

intervened.

It is possible, but not certain, that the Conservatives in 2020 will oppose

a Federal UK in which case it will have to be fought for as the great Liberal reforming

government fought to end the powers of the House of Lords from 1906. Those of us

who supported Brexit were doing so as part of a much wider agenda of restoring our

very democracy which had been distorted by the false claim of post modernism that

the days of the nation state were over. Far from being over, the quiet unobstrusive

patriotism of Attlee has become recognised for what it was, a proper assertion of an

identity and that national identity, whether it be Scottish, Welsh, Irish or English

deserves to be treasured as a binding force, not divisive one. It all depends on whether we can find the correct balance.

The formula for a blocking mechanism over changing the federal structures is

particularly difficult. My personal wish is for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to

be given a uniquely low threshold of 16% of the UK to be able to block legislative

changes affecting a federal UK Council. But there is a stronger case for that to be

raised to 20% which would involve the need for a further 4% of the population

coming from England which ensures working across all groupings.

In the Bundesrat a built-in blocking vote of a third of the Chamber is required on some constitutional matters. This is a delicate mechanism to devise and will need a lot of discussion but if the correct balance were to be achieved it could become a powerful unifier for the UK as the US Senate has been over the centuries.

At least until a Federal UK Council is established it would be better to retain a

non elected House of Lords to scrutinise the non federal legislation from the House of Commons. But since federal legislation will pass from the Lords to the UK Federal

Council, members of the Lords would have to be very substantially reduced in size,

eventually no more than 200 members and legislation would have to limit age and

length of tenure. The advantage of letting the Lords continue is that with reduced legislative coverage it could be reduced in size by nearly three quarters without generating a huge controversy and not impact on support for a Federal UK Council.

The House of Lords for centuries shared its space with the Law Lords until they were

transformed into a Supreme Court and this dual functionality could continue

particularly if adaptation coincided with the renovation of the Parliament building.

This approach fits with not introducing elections by proportional representation.

Better to focus and to succeed in creating a UK Federal Council.

 The Federal Council should, while having its base in Westminster, hold meetings in Belfast, Cardiff and Holyrood and could expect to start its life in the Westminster Conference Centre complex opposite Westminster Abbey in 2023.

It would be wise to use the 2020 party manifestoes as the basis for legislation

and not a referendum. The recent Brexit vote has not increased public enthusiasm for referendums. The capacity for the manipulation of a referendum was seen on the

Alternative Vote referendum conceded by the Conservative Party in the negotiations

with the Liberal Democrats. Every poll in the second half of that year showed AV

being won in a referendum. By February 2011 Ipsos/MORI had "Yes" on 49% and

AV looked certain to be endorsed in ten weeks time much to the chagrin of many

Conservatives and to predictions of adverse electoral consequences despite initial

claims by Cameron that AV would have few consequences. Cameron was forced to

focus on AV by Osborne who is reported to have said

"we have to win this .... thing; who cares what Clegg thinks?"

 Cameron true to his character moved fast. Money was found to overpower the "Yes" to Fairer Votes campaign. Also more and more people became aware that AV was neither truly proportional nor fair and could have bizarre results. Some also saw it as yet another manipulation agreed post election inside the coalition by Conservatives and Liberal Democrats with no electoral mandate. The "No" campaign spent the last few weeks exposing the three 'Cs': cost, complexity and Clegg.

The Liberal Democrat leader at the time was ruthlessly lampooned and Cameron now talked of AV being

"bad for democracy"

Not something he ever said while the negotiations were underway. On 5 May the

referendum resulted in the "No" campaign achieving 67.9% support with 30.1%

voting "Yes" to AV. The turnout was a miserable 42.2%.

Cameron then won the Scottish referendum and ‘Project Fear’ emerged as a

technique.

Overconfident, he felt he could do the same on the EU referendum but

‘Project Fear’ across the UK backfired as did the visit of President Obama. There is

nothing unusual about this political saga. Tammany Hall politics is not confined to

New York nor to any one political party in the UK. Referenda are a device, part of

the struggle for power in democratic politics. First past the post is also part of a

struggle for retaining power. It is kept by Conservative MPs because it best suits them win and many Labour politicians believe it is better for their Party than proportional representation. The Labour left prefers to wait out of power longer in order to be more certain of being in a position to make radical reforms when in power.

Democracy can benefit from more online petitions, more sophisticated polling

of policy options, more popularly triggered debates in Parliament and elsewhere.

Jeremy Corbyn in his first appearance at Prime Minister’s Questions by asking the

question of a named voter created a more serious dialogue.

Of course, partisan politics will continue; it is the life blood of political debate. But the relentless adversarial, abrasive cockpit in the House of Commons has outlived its time and the ever larger House of Lords is an indefensible combination of patronage and privilege where peerages are seen to have their price.

Labour will need to consider how to win support for a Federal UK legislation

from some of the smaller UK parties, not just the SNP, but Liberal Democrats, Greens, Plaid Cymru, and even on improving their representation in the House of Commons.

A limited seats deal to help the Liberal Democrats and Greens in England and Plaid

Cymru in Wales should be considered by Labour if there was a manifesto agreement

on specific proposals for a Federal UK with those parties by early 2020. The widest

possible grouping of parties will help create a national mood for reform as it did for

the Liberal Party in the 1906 General Election when the Liberals offered seat deals to help Labour. My great grandfather, Alderman William Llewellyn, was then the

Liberal leader of Glamorgan County Council. He was also Chairman of the Ogmore

Vale Liberal Association and interestingly of its Liberal and Labour Association.

They made those ‘seat deals’ in Wales before the large 1906 Liberal victory to

maximize their appeal for the constitutional reform of the power of the Lords.

I have no hesitation in saying that Labour will have to become more open-minded

on the principle of individual seat deals with parties in England within a truly

progressive alliance if they are to stand a chance of becoming the government in 2020.

Pacts or deals do not involve merging of parties or the loss of their identity, but they

could be the means to power for Labour on a commitment to legislate in the House of Commons for a Federal UK.

The number of seats involved are not great but they exist where Labour not having to field a candidate in seats where under all circumstances they cannot expect to win, and where it enhances a smaller party’s chance under the first past the post system of beating the Conservatives. Gaming the system in the absence of proportional representation is a reasonable response to the first past the post distortions and it is high time Labour took a calculated decision to be involved in

this as they were to their benefit in the election of 1906.

Summary

Referendums will not be in fashion at Westminster after the 2016 EU

referendum. A Federal UK could become a post-Brexit priority with broader

support than would have been conceivable before 2016. If the Prime Minister

does not form an all party convention to consider a Federal UK Council every

possible step should be taken by Labour to negotiate key elements of a Federal

UK Council with the SNP, first which then must include as many MPs from all

the other parties as possible so as to create legislation for a Federal UK Council

as soon as possible after the 2020 General Election.

https://constitution-unit.com/2016/11/10/we-need-a-cross-party-convention-to-consider-proposals-for-a-federal-uk-council/

View the full pamphlet here: a-federal-uk-council-2