A
guest essay by Glyndwr Cennydd Jones
The United Kingdom (UK) is governed as a
unitary state comprising England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, all of
which are intrinsically linked culturally and historically in modern times
through shared industrial, political and international experiences.
Devolution, as introduced in the late-1990s,
aimed to address a measure of perceptible disenchantment across the isles due
to unease with over-centralisation whilst
retaining sovereignty in the hands of the Westminster parliament. Subsequent
electoral majorities in Westminster, coalitions and the present supply and
confidence agreement have challenged the governments in Belfast, Cardiff and
Edinburgh with the twin prospects of constitutional uncertainty and political
vulnerability. The latter specifically complicates power sharing at Stormont
and generally raises questions about the fair distribution of funding. The
finance secretaries of both Scotland and Wales wrote a letter to the UK
Treasury in late-July 2017 stressing that the Barnett formula should apply to
the one billion pounds of additional support now earmarked for Northern Ireland.
The extent of divergence
in today’s UK is highlighted by the four nations’ differentiated politics, apprehensions
about the Brexit negotiations, uncertainties regarding the post-EU Northern Ireland
border, debates concerning a second Scottish independence referendum, and broad
unease with the recent Wales Act. In
March 2017, Professor Richard Rawlings observed in a BBC Radio Wales interview that
the Act’s list of reserved powers, as retained by Westminster and Whitehall, is
too extensive and potentially ‘claws back’ devolution in some fields.
Interestingly,
the report titled Devolution and the
Future of the Union (The
Constitution Unit, University College London: April 2015) affirms that: ‘the UK
is hardly unique in facing challenges to its structure and integrity…though it
is unique in seeking to do so without a formal written constitution.’ This
report explores three models of increasing devolution as possible solutions. Heftier
doses of the same medicine may appeal as a remedy to some, but does not address
the symptomatic ambiguity introduced by the general primacy of Westminster and
the inherent challenges presented by the unitary state. The current situation
is compounded by the disconcerting shadow of a potentially hard Brexit, enacted
on all four nations, if the needs of all are not properly represented in
negotiations.
Earlier
this year, Lord Elystan Morgan highlighted that: ‘a good proportion of the
reserved powers in the Wales Act 2017 reside at Brussels not Westminster.’ Former Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Baroness Randerson asserted that the UK should: ‘use the repatriation of powers from the
EU to establish a new federal state of equals.’ Lord David Owen advocates a federal structure based on
the German model in his paper titled A
Federal UK Council (November 2016), whilst the report titled UK’s Changing
Union, Towards a New Union (Wales
Governance Centre, Cardiff University: February 2015) proposes a union state
not a unitary state which: ‘consists of four national entities sharing
sovereignty…and freely assenting to cooperate in a Union for their common good.
This signals the end of devolution and a move to a more overtly federal or
quasi-federal framework.’
Professor Jim Gallagher goes further: ‘people often talk about
federalism as if it were a solution for the UK. In truth the UK is already
moving beyond it, to a more confederal solution.’ Reflecting on his paper titled
Britain after Brexit, Toxic Referendums and Territorial Constitutions (October
2016), Gallagher envisages: ‘a
confederation of nations of radically different sizes, sharing things that
matter hugely, like economic management, access to welfare services and defence.’
He explains that Brexit presents the: ‘UK’s first chance in decades of an
effective regional economic policy, so that central government can direct
resources to the poorer areas of the country and use them in imaginative
ways.’
In a federation, sovereignty is shared
between central and constituent nation governments. Each level has clearly articulated functions, with some powers pooled between them, but none has absolute authority over the others. Agreed practices and rules are confirmed through
a written constitution with compliance enforced by a Supreme Court. In contrast, a confederation is a union of
sovereign member nations that for reasons of efficiency and common security assign
a portfolio of functions and powers by treaty to a central body.
Collective functions
of a federation or confederation might typically encompass to varying degrees: the
armed and security forces; border, diplomatic
and international affairs; shared public services; cross-recognition of legal jurisdictions;
currency and monetary policies; a single market; and select taxation, as appropriate. Federations generally have central institutions in
place to implement many taxes (e.g. USA operates the Internal Revenue Service,
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, and
the US Customs and Border Protection), and foreign policy. Confederations
raise collective budgetary funds annually through each member nation’s contributions
of a defined proportion of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Internally,
these nations operate distinct tax regimes and act unilaterally in most fields
of foreign affairs and law, unless centrally assigned.
The report titled Federal Britain, The Case for Decentralisation
(Institute of Economic Affairs: 2015) perceptively
explains that: ‘fiscal
decentralisation is associated with higher national income, better school
performance and higher levels of investment. In particular, the
decentralisation of revenue-raising powers has a stronger effect on performance
than the decentralisation of spending. The evidence suggests that increasing
the local share of taxation from 5% to 20%—still low by G7 standards—could
raise GDP per capita by 6%. With especially low levels of revenue
decentralisation, and as a large country, the UK is in a particularly good
position to gain from transferring powers and revenue-raising.’ More research
is required to better understand the probable medium to long term economic
impacts on each nation of moving towards a federal or confederal model of governance.
In a federation, an individual is a citizen of the
central overarching structure and the
constituent nation within which they reside, participating democratically in
electing representatives to the legislative parliaments at both levels of
government. Typically, a party political
system operates across the whole. In a confederation, individuals elect
representatives to take part in central policy decision-making processes more in
the role of trustees acting on behalf of their member nation’s interests.
National parliaments, not individuals, are represented in the central
institutions with citizens relating directly to their member nation and only
indirectly to the confederation. For example, Article 8:1 of the mainly
confederal Treaty of European Union states that: ‘every person holding the
nationality of a member state shall be a citizen of the Union.’
Therefore, a
federation sets out to provide constitutional clarity and stability across constituent
nations with shared mechanisms in place for advancing joint interests and
resolving disputes. It also capitalises on the potential for realising
economies of scale in the delivery of a few centrally held key functions, which
may allow for the proportional redistribution of joint prosperity generated
through the federal capital, and a greater projection of political influence in
attracting investment internationally. By comparison, a confederation presents
to each member nation both the advantages and the challenges of acting as a
sovereign state within an isles-wide alliance. A treaty on issues of shared
concern aims to mitigate any risks associated with fragmenting previously
delivered common functions. Competitive considerations have more prominence between
member nations when negotiating within a confederal-type relationship, balanced
against the consensus model largely offered by federalism, and the cost savings
achieved through operating formal joint mechanisms across many key areas of
governance are not secured to the same extent.
The constitutional choice may not
be purely binary in nature. Professor John Kincaid, in his article titled Confederal Federalism and Citizen Representation in the European
Union (Western European Politics, Volume 22: 1999 Issue 2), details: ‘what seems to have developed
in the EU is...a confederal order of government that operates in a
significantly federal mode within its spheres of competence.’ Member nations have
delegated, in effect, parts of their sovereignty over time to central bodies which
agree laws on their behalf. For example, the
existence of an EU common currency within what is mainly a confederal treaty illustrates
the point.
Reflecting on the varied politics across the four nations, the progressively
sustainable model might well rest along the continuum between a Federation and a League or Union of the Isles
in time (i.e. a confederation). In
crude terms, the former option has aspects of a safety net deployed with many
shared instruments of governance established to support the realisation of economies
of scale, in delivery, and to address the common interests held by constituent
nations. The latter option allows for agreement and partnership
amongst fully empowered member nations on matters of collective concern, but with competitive considerations likely
to complicate interactions between them. A League or Union of the Isles could invite
participation by the Republic of Ireland if so desired, dealing neatly with the
post-Brexit issue of the border with the north. It could also address the
wishes of Scotland if independence is sought.
As well as those key common interests demanding
some form of agreed centrally-held functions for defence, foreign affairs,
finance and home affairs as already described, there are also many mutual considerations
of a general nature which might require the establishment of other useful structures
to promote cooperation and harmonisation of laws across the isles. These
considerations include postal,
telephonic and internet communications; railways, roads and associated
licensing; airports, ports and traffic controls; coastguard and navigational
services; energy, water and related infrastructure; income and corporation
taxes; rates of sales, weights and measures; copyrights, patents and
trademarks; scientific and technological research; broadcasting; meteorological
and oceanographic forecasting; environmental and ecological protection; civil
defence and emergencies; prevention of terrorism and serious crime. Such
structures could be critical within a political climate where the EU can no
longer be relied upon to promote the necessary collaborations and
understandings.
The extent to which an incline towards federalism would support greater
constitutional clarity, comfort and confidence should not be underestimated,
especially on matters of defence,
social mobility and trade. However, a tilt towards confederalism, with England established
as one unit alongside Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales could provide a
solution to one of the more difficult issues presented by the federal-only solution.
To quote Dr Andrew Blick from his web article titled Four
Options for Configuring the British Constitution (London School of
Economics and Political Science: February 2015): ‘the UK already has more diversity in certain
respects than might be found even in a federation, for instance through the
existence of three different legal systems…with a fourth possibly coming in
Wales.’ Blick highlights that: ‘a
practical problem involves how to incorporate England into a federal UK. If
England were included as a single unit, since it accounts for more than 80% of
the population, federalism might create instability worse than that which it
sought to correct. Another approach could be for England to participate in a
federation in a series of more manageably-sized regions. Yet it is not clear
how to demarcate these territories, and whether they would command sufficient
popular attachment to make the federal project politically viable. Nonetheless,
a federal UK may become the most plausible means of preserving the UK,
necessitating a resolution to this English dilemma.’ It should be noted that both
constitutional models of federalism and confederalism allow for some further
devolution of powers within England at a tier of governance immediately below that
of National Parliament level.
In national terms, there is a clear distinction between
the existentialist and utilitarian views of self-government. The former demands
more autonomy simply because of a belief that it is the natural right for
nations, and the latter considers it as a path to a better society—to achieve
the most effective political unit for securing the economic growth and social
justice that people deserve. A solution somewhere on the continuum between
federalism and confederalism could encourage and support a real partnership of
equals across these isles, sharing specific powers to address collective
interests whilst valuing the autonomy of each nation. It could also promote many
of the aspirational advantages sought for by self-government at the same time
as ensuring confidence in the fields of diplomacy, economics and security which
the current unitary state advocates.
So what might such a governance model look
like?
A League or Union of the Isles
would be established as a confederation of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland
and Wales with aspects of federal-type control built into key policy portfolios
to reflect the principles of equality and solidarity amid member nations. The
Head of the Confederation could continue to be Her Majesty and successors. Each
nation would hold every power and right which were not by treaty, or constitution,
delegated to joint institutions, operating distinct legal jurisdictions. Such a
jurisdiction in Wales would be subject to formation by the National Parliament
in Cardiff.
A Council of the Isles would
be introduced with mechanisms created
to address the asymmetry between the population sizes of member nations,
particularly through the composition and distribution of seats. Members of the
Council would be elected for a four-year period, potentially through the
political party-list approach of proportional representation by the electors of
each nation, convening annually for a fixed period unless urgent business is
demanded. The Council would assume its own standing orders, confirming a
Presiding Officer and Executive whose Prime Minister and Ministers would be
responsible for enacting legislative power throughout the isles on matters involving
defence, foreign affairs, finance, home affairs and mutual cooperation (as
defined by treaty or constitution).
Each Bill considered by the Council could be usefully circulated to the
National Parliaments of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in
advance of final reading, with member nations empowered to make
representations, as necessary, to affirm objections or suggest amendments
before voting. On passing, the Head of State would confirm the Bill as an Act
of the Council of the Isles. Lord Owen
has proposed (2016): ‘until a Federal UK Council
is well established I suggest retaining a non-elected House of Lords to
scrutinise the legislation that does not concern federal interests.’ Similarly,
Professor Gallagher has stated (2016) that: ‘the House
of Lords’ might be used ‘as an effective Senate…of the Isles, holding the UK’s
governments to account for their joint activities.’ He evokes: ‘a grand
committee of the House...with no partisan majority, and with 55% English
members so the devolved are consciously overrepresented.’ The ultimate
authority on all questions regarding the legitimacy of any law and treaty would
remain with the Supreme Court.
A Congress of Member Nations,
comprising the Council’s Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, as well
as the First Minister of each member nation, would convene regularly to discuss
those general and mutual considerations which demand a degree of cooperation
and harmonisation of laws as outlined earlier, besides the key centrally held
functions. The Congress, with support of the Council, could also hold controls
for confirming contractual-type arrangements for the supply of additional public
services to member nations if requested. To cover the common functions and
other agreements in place, the Council would levy charges upon each member
nation according to a defined proportion of their GDP annually relative to that
of the confederation as a whole. These monies would be paid into a consolidated
fund from which the interest on the UK public debt would continue as a standing
charge. The Council, working with the Congress, should aim
to promote equality in
sharing a measure of the baseline investment for infrastructure projects across
the isles. In the interests of advancing ongoing solidarity and mitigating elements
of financial risk, it might also be desirable to assign some central responsibility
for pensions alongside federal-type mechanisms for collecting what is presently
termed National Insurance Contributions appropriately renamed.
The National Parliament of each member nation would sit as the legislative
and representative body of its people, enacting powers and laws on every issue
that is not identified as the Council’s sole competence. A Government with
executive powers would be appointed from the nation’s parliamentary members,
comprising a First Minster and other ministerial positions as required to
oversee the various offices. The superior judges in each member nation would be
nominated on the advice of an independent authority with established institutions
in place to scrutinise public appointments, including auditor general, and to
operate as an ombudsman. Nations could further sub-divide their lands through
Acts of National Parliament, defining the composition and responsibilities of local
government authorities.
Is there a detectable
appetite in England, Scotland and Wales for exploring a journey towards
federalism and beyond?
The
report titled A Constitutional
Crossroads, Ways Forward for the United Kingdom (The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law: May 2015) does indeed propose:
‘moving towards a more federal, codified constitutional arrangement for the
UK,’ as it would: ‘establish permanent devolution on the basis of more clearly
defined principles and rules.’ Also, the Constitution
Unit, University College London is presently working on a substantial project investigating
the design options for an English Parliament. Support for such a development has
grown considerably in recent years with potential governance models now being
examined seriously. A report is due to be published in Autumn 2017.
The Constitutional Commission in Scotland, from which several
of the institutional ideas explored in the paragraphs above are inspired, goes
further in its web-article titled A Confederal UK? (2015). This suggests that a
confederal-type arrangement: ‘would
enable Westminster to continue as the Parliament of England, while a limited
range of confederal powers—relating to the Crown, defence, foreign policy, currency,
passports, and a few incidentals—would be vested in a new Confederal Assembly.
Each state would be able to adopt its own institutions within a broad
constitutional framework that would secure fundamental rights and help protect
the integrity of political processes.’ Intriguingly, a confederal response to
the constitutional question could be to the advantage of England and Scotland
more than Northern Ireland and Wales, whose less affluent regions might benefit
from the greater support made available through a federal arrangement.
Speaking from a Wales perspective, Gwynoro Jones (2017), an experienced political commentator
on matters of devolution, has gone on the record as saying that ‘the Welsh Assembly has been hamstrung from
the beginning and has been devoid of the freedom to act with effective powers.
I do not blame Nicola Sturgeon for re-opening the conversation on support for
independence in Scotland, nor Gordon Brown for suggesting a federal solution
for Scotland in the UK. With the Brexit result I believe that the future lies,
at the very least, in a self-governing Wales within a federal UK.’
Greater fiscal devolution does, of course, present challenges,
opportunities and risks. In the medium to long term, much depends on how a more
influential Welsh government and an informed public respond to financial
empowerment over time. Questions also remain on how the present significant
deficit in Wales could be supported during transition whether through adjustment
of the block grant, substantially restructured budgeting and judiciously
strategic borrowing, or a combination of these approaches. In this regards, the
report titled UK’s Changing Union, Towards a New Union (Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University: February 2015)
advocates a: ‘system for determining the fair distribution and redistribution
of financial resources on a clear statutory basis...designed to be equitable
between all parties on the basis of examination of needs and with no
expectation that transfers would be continued when needs had been met
satisfactorily.’
Anyone who has read the report titled Government Expenditure and Revenue
Wales (Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University: April 2016) must concede that
something of a fundamentally structural nature should be done to stimulate the
Welsh economy, so as to encourage entrepreneurship internally and investment
externally through capable and confident institutions which are focused and
motivated on supporting businesses and creating employment opportunities. There
are indeed examples of hitherto financially challenged nations which on
establishing greater autonomy, within the last two decades or so, are now bearing the fruits of their ambitions, innovations and labours,
having admittedly experienced difficulties at the outset.
In February 2017, an event on Brexit,
Federalism, and Scottish Independence at the Constitution Unit, University
College London concluded that: ‘federalism appears to be a way out of the intractable,
binary divisions that are fracturing the UK and its constituent nations.’ There
is a: ‘need to shift away from a winner-takes-all mentality and to focus instead on healing divides through
strategic compromise. A federal or confederal solution that works for the
overwhelming majority, rather than a marginal one, seems to be an effective way
to achieve this. It is up to the UK government and its constituent nations to
gather the will to work for such a compromise.’
As with most things in life, he or she who pays the piper
does inevitably have first choice of tune, or at least in convening an agenda
for a much needed Constitutional Convention…
