As the Liberal Democrats gather in Bournemouth it’s Time for explanations

The party can only move forward successfully by understanding precisely what went wrong, why it happened and what are the lessons for the future?

Local campaigning did not let us down - it was bad decision making, loss of identity, failure in strategic thinking, no exit strategy from the Coalition and finally wrong election messages.  

The challenges confronting the Liberal Democrats as they congregate in Bournemouth this weekend will be the greatest facing any party of what used to be termed the third force in British politics since 1970. Back then the Liberals only had six MPs, a 7.5% share of the vote and just 2.1 million people voting for the party.

When David Steel was leader the Liberals had 11 MPs after the October 1974 election, taking a 13.8% share of the vote with 4.3 million voting for the party. After thirty years and more of hard work the SDP/Liberal Alliance and then the Liberal Democrats had gone from 6 to 62 MPs, from around 1,500 Councillors to over 3,500, had 11 Euro MEPs and a membership of 100,000.

After May 2015 the party has only 8 MPs, having received 7% of the vote in the general election and with merely 2.1 million voting Liberal Democrat – very similar to 45 years ago. Forty eight seats were lost and 4.5 million voters turned their backs on us. Yet Nick Clegg in an interview after the election said ‘I haven’t destroyed the Liberal Democrats’, well maybe not but he came pretty close to it. No party in my lifetime has suffered such a calamitous and disastrous General Election result.

Presenting and maintaining a high profile at Westminster, as we have already discovered, will become increasingly difficult and with only eight MPs their absence from important debates will be noticed. Then some two-thirds of our party spokespeople reside in the Lords - rather incongruous for a party that bears a name like ours. 

Whereas it looked highly likely that Tim and his colleagues could make the running on issues such as welfare, housing, poverty, human rights, equality and democracy Jeremy Corbyns' Labour Party will seek to hijack those. Even on Europe he is already manoeuvering towards changing his position. Appointing someone to shadow Constitution Convention is more significant than has been yet realised.  I am sure it will be voting reform next because the TUC has opened the door this week at their conference in Brighton.

Thankfully there are early signs of recovery. Membership has increased some 15,000 since the general election and is approaching 65,000. Since the General Election the Liberal Democrats have won 19 local council elections with 10 of them gains from other parties. There have been a string of notable and encouraging local government by- election victories in areas such as Falmouth, Brecon, Lancing, Mole Valley, Richmond, Rother, Winsford, Wrexham and Pontypridd with good performances in a number of other areas such as Tunbridge Wells, West Oxford, Camborne and Maidstone. Significantly we've been gaining seats from the Conservatives, Labour and UKIP. However the party continues to be static at around 8 -10% in the UK opinion polls and it is that wider profile that will require addressing.. 

I am firmly of the view that the party can only move forward successfully by facing up to precisely what went wrong, why it happened and what are the lessons for the future? In essence let there be no cover up.

It will not serve Tim Farron nor the party and our members any good at all to sweep things under the carpet and allow matters to fester. This Saturday afternoon, if I have read the agenda correctly, there will be an opportunity to discuss why last May came about. That will be the appropriate time to discuss openly and in a constructive spirit the causes of the party’s disastrous performance. It is nowhere near acceptable enough for the Liberal Democrats to follow the former deputy Prime Minister's line, stating that we won’t apologise for the coalition years—explaining that we put ‘country before party’ and even suggesting that he would do the same again!

So let the debate on Saturday be something akin to a ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ session to ‘clear the air’ and to allow all the negative feelings and disappointments to be laid to rest. Whether it will be about the issues that will be mentioned in this article, the manifesto, style of campaigning, the messages we were conveying to the electorate or whatever else. It will make for a cleaner and clearer break with the coalition years, facilitate a fresher start under Tim Farron’s leadership and enable us to return to being that party of fairness, equality, justice, compassion, reform and progress. A line will have been drawn in the sand.

Kirsty Williams the Welsh Liberal Democrats Leader has voiced her opinions on the coalition years and they are very well made. They are ones that I totally agree with. In summary she says:

‘We lost a colossal amount of trust over tuition fees.  Not only did we break our pledge … it’s worse than that, it never even looked like we fought to keep it…it was a mistake of the highest order and one for which we were never forgiven…Details no longer mattered, people simply stopped listening’.

‘The Tories, frankly, were better prepared back in 2010, constructed a more potent narrative, and were brilliant at assimilating Lib Dem policies and boxing us in. Critically, they owned the economic narrative and made the political weather. We got the grief when things went wrong and never the credit for the good stuff’.

‘Let us be in no doubt, although we were dealt a difficult hand, we could have handled it better. Obsessed with showing that coalition could work and that we could take ‘tough decisions’ we lost our own focus, our own identity, forgot to take ownership of our achievements until it was too late … From the Rose Garden on, we were swallowed up’. 

‘We appeared to the electorate to leap from a firm and hard fought anchorage in one part of UK politics to another without so much as a by-your-leave’

‘Saying that it was disorienting for those who had supported us when we formed the coalition with the Tories for five years is perhaps one of the great understatements of the last parliament. Sometimes, even from within, it felt like we were struggling to locate a compass to navigate our way through with our values unscathed’. 

It is difficult to argue with the points made above. On Saturday someone needs to explain what on earth went on and why didn’t the corporate body of the Liberal Democrats at Westminster and the various committees of the party put a stop to what was going on? Kirsty’s summary indicates to me that there was something radically wrong with the way the party was operating.

The outcome of the 2010 General Election presented the Liberal Democrats with a difficult decision and in the end it was a defining moment in the history of the Liberal Democrats. I concede that it was not one of Nick Clegg’s choosing, but it needed to be considered in the context of achieving the best outcome for the good of the Liberal Democrats in the longer-term. That had to be a key part of the equation. We all understood that the country was in a dire financial situation and that a government had to be formed, but it is my view that a more sensitive, sensible and astute leader would have turned always in the first instance for advice and guidance from his four predecessors. After all, David Steel had experience of a Lib/Lab pact in action during the late 1970s. 

Nick Clegg was very much a ‘new kid on the block’ in 2010 with only five years’ experience of Westminster politics. He became an MP in 2005 and leader in 2007, so surely his first port of call for advice should have been his four predecessors as well as more senior Liberal Democrat MPs'—many of whom had been in Parliament since the 1980's. It appears that this did not happen, which I find beyond any understanding—other than wondering whether there was an arrogant conviction present and a pre-determined mind set of the course he was about to embark upon.

Evidently the negotiating team set up to negotiate with the Tories and, then later, with Labour comprised younger and the newer MPs as well as advisers. That, to me, fits the scenario well as he most probably knew that he could dictate comfortably to them the desired outcome.

Again, Nick Clegg seemed to be in a hurry to come to an agreement and form a coalition government. His haste tends to reaffirm my view that he had firmed-up his position immediately after the election in favour of working with the Tories.

As a pure outsider, observing matters from a distance, I wonder whether his background, style and persona made him feel better suited to deal with the Cameron’s of this world? It is true that the media were rushing the agenda and pressing for an end to the uncertainty—which is always the way of the media circus—but he should have taken his time and been more considered.

My view is that the party was doomed from the outset of the coalition and most definitely well before half way through the coalition government period.

All the evidence points towards only one conclusion which is that after the 2010 General Election the only deal in town for the then Liberal Democrats leader was one with the Tories. He had made it clear several times before the election that in the event of a hung parliament he would talk first to whichever party held the largest number of seats—more often than not, at the time, the opinion polls were continually favouring the Tories as the likely largest party.

The long standing constitutional practice in our country of the incumbent Prime Minister being allowed to have the first opportunity of forming a government in the event of an inconclusive election result was for some reason put to one side. For those with a long memory that is precisely what happened in February 1974 when the incumbent Prime Minister Ted Heath lost by a few seats but yet was allowed to attempt to form a government by a seeking a coalition or working arrangement with Jeremy Thorpe and the Liberal Party whilst Harold Wilson remained patiently in the wings. Wilson had 301 MPs to Heath's 297 MPs and there were 14 Liberal MPs.

Therefore, was no-one advising Nick Clegg about our UK convention or was it a case that he just is not the listening type—and that his mind had already been made up about dealing with Labour?  Certainly it was not the case that Gordon Brown had no right to try and form a minority Labour government. David Steel has argued correctly that Clegg should have gone to see the incumbent PM firstly and explore seriously the possibility of a LibDem-Lab coalition. He explained that such a coalition would be ‘one more in tune with what the voters had understood of our consistent Liberal ideology under all six leaders since Jo Grimond. The arithmetic might still have prevented it, but he would have probably got a better deal out of Cameron’.

I genuinely fail to understand why Steel, Ashdown, Kennedy and Campbell, did not carry sway with Nick Clegg. In the immediate aftermath of the election, David Steel accepted his share of the blame and I find it quite staggering what he had to say—‘I really did not know Clegg and indeed recall having met him only once. Not very substantial excuses, I admit. So I take my share of blame.’

Liberal Democrat members invariably turn to the good things that were achieved in Government, including decisions affecting income tax thresholds and pension reforms etc. Unfortunately, those things got swallowed up in the hurly burly of coalition politics. It was clear that the Tories had a much better publicity machine. As Kirsty Williams points out ‘we took ownership of our achievements too late’. It really was too late to make an attempt at highlighting these achievements finally in the heat of a general election campaign. Again I return to the corporate responsibility of the MPs and Peers—where were the open ‘rows’ in Parliament to indicate unhappiness? More importantly to convey to the electorate that although we might be in coalition with the Tories, but that we remain different from them and can actually disagree publicly on many key issues!  It all appeared too cosy—and ultimately we paid a heavy price with significant consequences for the future.

Many political and tactical misjudgements were made. The timing of the AV referendum and the attempt at reforming the House of Lords were two of the most high profile. Electoral reform has been a long standing party aspiration but AV was certainly not party policy. A referendum should have been delayed, not only until a proper policy had been agreed, but until a more opportune time presented—not arranged in the midst of an economic crisis with austerity measures in full flow. It all made no sense and the level of mismanagement is truly mind boggling. This was followed by the House of Lords reform bill which ignored the party’s long standing policy on the matter and, just like the AV referendum, was always destined to fail as it eventually did. 

The real fiasco involved student fees which meant that Nick Clegg and the party lost credibility with one fell swoop very early in the life of the coalition government. From then on, the leader was damaged goods and it soon became obvious to me that there would be no way back at the next general election. A coalition with the Tories was bad enough, but the leader’s betrayal of the students meant that whatever achievements the party secured in government would not be sufficient to overcome the main perception that Nick Clegg was not a man to be trusted.

Again as David Steel pointed out in his post-election analysis—‘at a stroke, we had lost trust as a party, one of the few tangible assets we had especially after the Kennedy/Campbell decision to oppose the invasion of Iraq. The pledge was not just only in our manifesto but every candidate, including Clegg, had campaigned vigorously on the issue’.

Lately an issue has arisen that was reported on around September 10^th that the former Deputy Prime Minister was offered a ‘pass’ on a rise in tuition fees by George Osborne in view of its sensitive and crucial importance to the Liberal Democrats but he apparently turned the offer down. It is claimed that in his heart he did not agree with the party’s policy as stated in the election manifesto. That account has also been confirmed to me by a source that had that very same said to him by Clegg in 2012. This story has been on Facebook and Twitter and I asked openly for him to disown that assertion but hitherto nothing has been forthcoming. If true it was a despicable act. The party has a right to learn the truth because the heart and soul of our movement was not his to play with around with. 

How often have politicians heard voters say to them that ‘you are all the same’ and also ‘you all say one thing in opposition and do something different in government’. So along came an inexperienced Westminster political leader—glibly casting that sort of ‘feedback’ aside—promptly breaking a very public and solemn promise. Well we certainly discovered what happens to leaders and parties that espouse such a highly publicised and solemn promise during an election campaign and then, very soon after in government, do the opposite.

Late on Nick Clegg apparently offered to resign and Paddy Ashdown said that Nick was in the ‘darkest of the dark nights of the soul’. I don’t find that surprising at all. What was surprising was that the Parliamentary Party did not accept his resignation. He was damaged goods. It was of little use a senior Liberal Democrats just telling him ‘ you don’t have the luxury – this is your burden ‘ or let’s ‘stick with the captain who has done nothing to deserve this’ Really ‘done nothing’? To me the insightful revelation came when Paddy Ashdown saying how it was ‘astonishing the speed from which he (Nick) moved from the darkest hour of the dark nights to utterly on form’. That doesn’t surprise me either.  

  

Before concluding I have to turn to the Nigel Farage fiasco and the matter of Nick Clegg’s mind-set and judgement over holding a television debate on Europe. This was an ill-thought-out strategy and one that held no clear advantage to the deputy Prime Minister. I repeat the misgivings I always have had over the leader’s judgement and leadership in political matters. I can only assume that he must have concluded that this was going to be his road back to popularity and maybe even ‘forgiveness’ from the electorate for what he had done in 2010. But firstly, the debates were going to be on the  wrong topics—Europe and immigration. The opinion polls should have alerted him to the dangers he faced on these issues. From that moment on the deputy Prime Minister, his party cabinet colleagues, ministers in the Government and MPs were viewed as being on the same level as the leader of a party that then had no Members of Parliament. Once again I return to the matter of corporate responsibility. Was there not someone older, wiser and more experienced around to put a stop to this fiasco?

Gareth Epps a member of two party Federal Committees wrote towards the end of June a very revealing account of the coalition years and as an insider he probably knew a lot about what went on. This quote is sufficient for me to understand exactly and it coheres with my suspicions about the former leader ‘the party’s internal apparatus failed or was not allowed to do its job to hold leaders to account.  From 2011-14 Nick Clegg attended the Federal Policy Committee only once, suggesting as he has said since that he did not hold this body with very much respect.  Party secrecy rules were ramped up so members of Federal Committees, elected by the party, were forbidden from communicating what they were doing or even discussing’. 

So it wasn’t just the parliamentary party that was dysfunctional from very early on in the five year period. Most crucially, no one had figured out an exit-strategy—carrying on in coalition until the end of Parliament was suicidal. We should have walked out of Government some 12 months before the election and let the Tories govern as a minority government. We needed time to re-establish our identity and try to recoup some trust and support. It could have been planned and orchestrated over a period of months with ministers resigning and Members of Parliament openly rebelling—with Peers and the Federal Executive and Policy committees playing their part as well.

It was obvious that something drastic had to happen for the Liberal Democrats to have any hope of avoiding decimation at the general election. There was no need to apply rocket science to that conclusion - opinion polls local government elections and the Euro election of 2014 had been flashing the warning signals for years. It would have been perfectly feasible to have sold to the public that after some three and a half years of doing our duty towards the country and that we had seen it through the worst times we were now going to return to our true radical tradition. What troubles me is that when I was at Westminster last week attending a meeting on voting reform I was told by two Conservatives members that they had been giving the very same such advice to Clegg. So what was holding him back? Was it the allure of being deputy Prime Minister? Until the end.

That the party has sufficient resilience and determination to fightback and renew itself is in no doubt but it will take time. This ‘politics of fear’ demeans the body politic. It is an issue that is clear Tim Farron will address head on. The party must stand up for the less well off in society as well as those who cannot help or care for themselves. Clearly show that we are on the side of those desperately trying to get onto the ladder of success and gain a modicum of prosperity whether unemployed through no fault of their own, a student, low wage earner or a public service worker who is being asked to accept a 1% annual pay rise for another four years.

Then, of course, there are the big issues over Britain’s future in Europe, the replacing Trident, our role in the world, a range of environmental and humanitarian matters and the ever widening spectre of international conflicts. In all these, the new leader will need to be radical and not afraid to tell people that Britain is nowhere near being a world power any longer and that we should stop pretending. The ever increasing reality is that the world is dominated by the USA, China and, to some extent, Russia, with Brazil, India and others quickly following behind. Of course, Germany is hugely influential in the European context. At best we are a middle ranking world power—lacking real military might and now international influence. In short, we are a European power and that is where our destiny lies—unless of course you fancy just being an isolated island in the Atlantic, as UKIP and the right wing of the Tories dream.

Remarkably Jeremy Corbyn has arrived on the scene as Labour's leader and we will be well advised not to underestimate the threat his style of politics poses the Liberal Democrats. His first poll ratings may not look clever but there are major challenges ahead for us and soon in Scotland and Wales.