and on the Welsh devolution settlement contained in the Wales Act
2017.
During the
House of Lords Brexit Bill debate Tuesday Feb 21 he raised what could become an
important matter that will undoubtedly impinge on the Act.
This is because
a good proportion of the reserved powers have resided in Brussels and so Westminster
does not have currently the totality of powers.
When these
powers are repatriated, they will be repatriated, of course, not to Wales nor
to Scotland but indeed, to Westminster.
A joint
body should be set up between Westminster and Wales to see exactly how one can
bring about a settlement that is fair, just and lasting.
He explained ….
‘Wales
achieved a reserved-powers constitution in that Act. As the House will
appreciate, there are two main patterns of devolution. One is a reserved-powers
constitution where there is notionally a transfer of the totality of powers and
then a reservation of certain specific exceptions. The other is a piecemeal
system—what is called conferred devolution—and that is what Wales had from 1964
onwards, when it achieved its Secretary of State, and indeed there have been
hundreds if not thousands of what one might call confetti-like situations of
conferring individual powers.
Central to the
concept of a reserved constitution is the idea that the mother parliament has
on the table, as it were, the totality of powers that are available and
relevant in the situation, and that the mother parliament looks upon those
powers and says, “This is all that we have. This is where we draw the dividing
line between the totality that is transferred and that small remnant that is
retained and reserved”.
If indeed for
some reason the mother parliament did not have the totality of powers at the
time, it goes to the very heart, kernel and essence of a reserved constitution.
I make the case that that is exactly what happened.
From 1972
onwards—indeed, from 1 January 1973 when we entered the Common Market—it meant
that the European Communities Act ruled with regard to a very considerable
swathe of legal authority. Exactly what percentage that represents of the laws
affecting us I would not like to calculate but it is very substantial. It may
be 25%, it may be 30% or 35%, or even higher. What it means for Wales, and it
affects Scotland in exactly the same way, is that some 5,000 elements of law
affect those devolved countries and yet the authority was not on the table of
the mother parliament. That seems to me to go to the very heart, core and
kernel of the idea of a reserved settlement.
What can one
do? We can look at three situations: one is the Sewel convention, a convention
that is now contained in the Scotland Act and the Wales Act of last year. That
convention says that it is accepted that the mother parliament, being the
supreme authority, can do what it wishes in relation to a devolved
Administration. It can change the situation overnight if it wishes, but it
will not do so, and would not think of doing so, unless asked by that
sub-parliament or unless there were some very exceptional circumstances. That,
as I said, has been written into the law by way of the Scotland Act and the
Wales Act.
It is a
convention. The Supreme Court said it was a convention and nothing more. It
does not have the power of law. That obviously must be the situation
technically. However, the Supreme Court went on in its judgment, in paragraph
151, to say that, nevertheless, a convention is important. It is binding
morally and politically. It goes on to say that such conventions are of immense
significance and have to be respected to bring about the harmonious situation
and amity between the mother parliament and the devolved parliaments.
Although you
might say that Europe was a reserved matter altogether, that is not so.
Paragraph 8 of the schedule says that, although European relations are
reserved, the question of the administration and oversight of the operation of
European relations is not reserved. Clearly, that is covered by the convention.
Secondly,
there is the question of the Joint Ministerial Committee, where, in utter
confidence, matters are disclosed between one party and another. It has a very
considerable future: it is possible to build a mutuality of trust that can be
more important for the future of the United Kingdom than anything else.
Thirdly, there
is the question of protocols. When the legislation was going through in
relation to Scotland and Wales in late 1990s, it was said that on matters that
were not devolved, there would have to be protocols. In fact, however, it was a
dead letter. I would like to see the breath of life breathed into the cold clay
and dry bones of such institutions, which I think have a very considerable
future.
As for the
situation now, when these powers are repatriated, they will be repatriated, of
course, not to Wales nor to Scotland but indeed, to Westminster.
A joint body
should be set up between Westminster and Scotland and between Westminster and
Wales to see exactly how one can bring about a settlement that is fair, just
and lasting.’