3 Nov. 1774
You choose a member indeed; but when
you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament .
If government were a matter of will
upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government
and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and
what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the
discussion;
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be
the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the
closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his
constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion,
high respect; their business, unremitted attention.
But authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience,--these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole;
where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the
general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
‘I am sorry I cannot conclude without saying a word on a topic touched upon by my worthy colleague. I wish that topic had been passed by at a time when I have so little leisure to discuss it. But since he has thought proper to throw it out, I owe you a clear explanation of my poor sentiments on that subject.
He tells you that "the topic of
instructions has occasioned much altercation and uneasiness in this city;"
and he expresses himself (if I understand him rightly) in favour of the
coercive authority of such instructions.
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be
the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest union, the
closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his
constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion,
high respect; their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to
sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above
all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own.
But his
unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought
not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does
not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They
are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable.
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.
My worthy colleague says, his will
ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If
government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought
to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and
judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the
determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and
another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three
hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?
To deliver an opinion, is the right of
all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a
representative ought always to rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most
seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions; mandates issued,
which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue
for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and
conscience,--these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and
which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our
constitution.
Parliament is not a congress of
ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must
maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but
parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation,
with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local
purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting
from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member indeed; but when you have
chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.
If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty
opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the
member for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to
give it effect.
I beg pardon for saying so much on this subject. I have been
unwillingly drawn into it; but I shall ever use a respectful frankness of
communication with you. Your faithful friend, your devoted servant, I shall be
to the end of my life: a flatterer you do not wish for.’
Right Honourable Edmund Burke.
(January 1729 – July 1797) was an Irish
statesman born in Dublin, as well as an author, orator, political theorist, and
philosopher who, after moving to London, served as Member of Parliament for
many years with the Whig Party.